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Case No. 7684

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT P. NIELSON and BEN H.
DAVIS, a co-partnership, doing
business as DAVIS NIELSON
CONSTRUCTION C 0 M PAN Y,
and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,

-vs.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, KEITH F. HUBBARD,
WESTERN ASBESTOS COMpANY, a corporation, and THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND

F I LSEOfYG

BRIEF

NOV 2 7 i951sHIRLEY P. JONES,
______S.HIRLEY P. JONES, JR.,
---ci~;t::s~~;;;-;;court, utAWorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT P. XIEL~OX and BEX H.
DAYI~, a co-partnership, doing
busine:'s a~ DA YlS KIELSOX
COXSTRrCTIOX C 0 :JI PAX Y,
and COXTIXEXTAL C~\SrALTY
CO:JIP ~\XY. a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.IXDrSTRL\L CO:JIJIISSIOX OF
rT~\H, KEITH F·. HUBBARD,
\YESTERX ASBESTOS COMPAXY, a corporation, and THE
STATE IKSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.
PL~\IXTIFFS'

Case No. 7684

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF

Come now the plaintiffs above named and respectfully petition this Court for re-hearing in the above entitled matter:
1. The Court misconstrued the findings of the Industrial Commission, failed to give effect to the uncontradicted testimony and by a process of its own reasoning made findings and conclusions at variance with those
of the Industrial Commission.
2. The Court erred in affirming the award of the
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Industrial Commission upon the grounds stated in the
decision herein.
3. If it is desired to affirm the award of the Industrial Commission, the rule of law heretofore prevailing in this state should be rejected and a definite rule
announced in accordance with the law hereafter to be applied, in order to avoid confusion and as a definite guide
to the Industrial Commission, employees, employers, and
their insurance carriers.
In support of the foregoing petition, plaintiffs present the following:
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS SUPPORTING THEIR
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is before this court on writ of certiorari to
the Industrial Commission to review an award against
the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants. This court
affirmed the award of the Commission and plaintiffs believe that the decision of this court upon the grounds
set forth therein is wrong and will tend to create future
confusion in the handling and disposition of similar cases.
In this case there is no hardship upon the employee either
by reason of the appeal from the Industrial Commission
or by reason of this petition for re-hearing. The employee
concededly is entitled to compensation either from the
plaintiffs or the State Insurance Fund and pending the
final determination of this case is being paid. The State
Insurance Fund initially paid compensation, which was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
later continued by the plaintiff Continental Casualty
Company after the award of the Industrial Com1nission.
There is, therefore, no urgency upon the part of the employee in this case, but there is urgent reason for a reconsideration by this court of its decision as we shall
attempt to point out in our argument. The points of the
argument will be discussed in the san1e order, set forth
above in the petition for re-hearing.
ARGU:JIENT

I.
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FINDINGS OF THE
IKDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, FAILED TO GIVE EFFECT
TO THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY AND BY A PROCESS OF ITS OWN REASONING MADE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

In its decision, the court makes various assertions
as to what the Industrial Commission found or must
have found, which do not actually reflect the findings
of the Commission and which are not supported by the
record. For instance, in the 3rd paragraph of the decision, the court says "It is obvious that the Commission
concluded that no herniation of the lumbosacral disc occurred at the time of the first strain, but that such herniation did occur at the time of the second." Actually the
Commission found that "applicant's injury of October 24,
1949 did such damage to his lumbosacral disc that degeneration began." (R. 82) Also, "the referee, therefore,
finds that the condition resulting from applicant's injury

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

of October 2+, 1949, was aggravated, * * * by his injury
of July 18, 1950." Degeneration is one of the processes
of herniation. Herniation is the protrusion of an organ
or a part thereof through the opening in the walls of
its natural cavity.
The testimony of all the doctors, including Dr. Robinson, is positive that the herniation commenced with the
first injury. Dr. Robinson when pressed on cross examination as to what is the cause of the pain stated, "when
the disc ruptures a portion of the substance extrudes
and presses on the nerves in the spinal canal." (R. 54)
The pain itself is the evidence of the rupture. Dr. Holbrook, (R. 63-64) testified that even if the patient, after
the first accident and injury, had recovered to the extent
that he had no pain, the doctor would still be of the opinion that the first accident was the cause of his hernia;
that he could have been normal between the two accidents
and his opinion would still be the same, to wit: that the
herniation or degeneration was initiated by the original
injury and further aggravated by the second injury. (R.
59) Dr. Holbrook also stated that he would still be of
this opinion even if the patient suffered immediate and
severe pain after the second accident because, "we know
that one of the characteristics of herniated discs is that
they may have pain in their backs and that may subside
and they may be symptom-free and the period may vary
between weeks and years until the patient will have more
symptoms."
Q. "What happens to the disc itself in those
periods?
A. "Apparently the disc protruded somewhat and
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pressed on the nerYes and then the pressure is relieved
by the extruded 1naterial where it no longer interferes
with the nerYe roots.'' (R. G-t) The record is quite clear
that the protrusion of the disr 1naterial causes pain
and that that is a characteristic of "herniated discs."
There is no question frmn the record that the e1nployee
sustained a herniation of the disc by the first injury
which later subsided when the extruded material no
longer interferred with the nerve roots, and that the
second injury aggravated the already existing condition.
Obviously the facts in this case are different than .lEtna
Life Insurance Company 1-:. Industrial Commission, 64
rtah -!15, 231 Pac. -!-!:2, because in the ~Etna case, it was
expressly pointed out that no hernia resulted from the
first accident, that there had never been any protrusion.
There was protrusion in this case, there was herniation. The period of pain between the time of the accident and the time a doctor was consulted is almost identical in both accidents. Thus, the Court is in error in saying that the Commission concluded that no herniation
occurred at the time of the first strain because the Commission expressly found that there was damage and
degeneration and "that the condition resulting from applicant's injury of October 24, 1949 was aggravated."
There is an express finding of a condition created or
caused by the October 24 injury, and that this condition was later aggravated.
The court in its decision also says that the Commission did not treat the second injury as a recurrence of
an existing first injury. We respectfully submit that
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the express language of the Commission's findings is
that the second accident caused a recurrence of an existing condition. It is impossible to aggravate a condition
if the condition never existed. It is impossible for the
first injury to "result in a condition" that was aggravated by the second injury without the second injury
being a recurrence of the first.
The court, also, confuses injury with disability.
There may be an injury with no disability, but it is not
the occurrence or onset of disability that determines
either the right of the employee to compensation or the
person who is liable for such compensation. Our statute
provides that the factor creating liability is the accident
causing the injury, not the accident causing the disability,
42-1-43. That is the whole theory of the cases similar to
the Continental Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 59, 221 Pac. 852, relied upon by the
plaintiffs in this case. In most, if not all, of the cases
holding the first employer liable for a recurrence by a
second accident of an injury incurred while in the employment of the first employer, the disability from the
first accident had ended, and the second accident caused
another disability. Nevertheless, the first em_ployer is
held liable as the one who caused that injury in the first
instance. So that the fact that the disability in the present case was precipitated by the second injury is immaterial under those cases. And if the court is going to
follow the Continental Casualty case, this case comes
squarely under it. If this court is not going to follow the
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Continental Casualty case, then the decision should so
state so that confusion will not result.
In the decision herein, the court 8ays, ''the award
itself, placing the risk on the second mnployer and its
carrier, also i8 consistent with the rejection of the recurrence idea.'' Of course, we cannot follow that reasoning because the Cmnmission squarely said that the July
lS injury, that is the second injury, was an aggravation
of the condition that resulted from the first injury. The
Connnission not only found that there was a first injury,
(which comrnenced the degeneration or herniation) but
also squarely found that the second injury was an aggravation of the first. Where the Commission went
wrong was in applying the aggravation theory to this
case. The statement of the Commission that the "aggravation theory is too well established to require extended
comment" is not a mere gratuity, as this court holds, but
was the very basis and foundation of the Commission's
decision. The Commission squarely found, and the language of the decision itself in this case shows, that the
second injury was a recurrence of the first. The Con1mission in stating that the herniation or extrusion was percipitated by the second injury found contrary to the evidence as we have already pointed out, which is that the
extrusion caused the pain suffered in the first injury and
the pain subsided when the pressure was relieved by the
extruded material. (R. 54) As we have shown, even Dr.
Robinson says that a herniated disc is what causes the
pain; that the rupture is a portion of the substance extruding and pressing on the nerves in the spinal canal.
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Herniation is not a single event. Herniation is a process
that vroceeds either to clear up without surgical relief,
or progresses to the point where surgical relief is necessary.
In the present case, everybody, including Dr. Robinson, when he was pinned down as above indicated,
stated that the herniation began with the first injury.
Whether or not it would have proceded to completion
without the intervention of the second accident was not
demonstrable. But, all the expert testimony was that the
condition which was surgically corrected began with the
first injury.
As above indicated, we submit that the decision is
in error: (1) in assuming that the Commission's award
on the aggravation theory was gratuitous (2) that it is
the one who is the employer at time of disability instead of the one who is the employer at the time the
injury is caused who is liable, and (3) that herniation
was a single event, instead of a progressive condition.
The court in stating that we say that the first accident
caused the disability is in error. There is no question
that the disability occurred after the second accident.
vVhat we contended was that the accident which caused
the injury was the first accident.
We, therefore, submit that the decision erroneously
reflects the findings of the Commission and is also contrary to the evidence and to the Continental Casualty
case, supra.
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II.
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UPON THE GROUNDS
STATED IN THE DECISION HEREIN.

We have tried to point out that this case is not similar to the ..:Etna case, because· in the ..:Etna case, there had
never been any degeneration or herniation as a result
of the first accident. We have, also, tried to point out
that as in the Continental Casualty case, supra, the fact
that the effects of the first injury had subsided and that
the second accident caused the disability is not the factor
that determines liability; that under the law of this state
as it has heretofore existed liability is determined by
the accident that causes the initial injury; that accident
is the proximate cause and all other accidents affecting
the same injury are recurrences or aggravations, ( aggravation is the same thing as recurrences) and the fact that
disability results from a subsequent accident does not
determine which employer is liable. Therefore, if the
Continental Casualty case is to be a law in this state, the
decision in this case is wrong.

III.
IF IT IS DESIRED TO AFFIRM THE AWARD OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THE RULE OF LAW HERETOFORE PREVAILING IN THIS STATE SHOULD BE REJECTED AND A DEFINITE RULE ANNOUNCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW HEREAFTER TO BE APPLIED IN ORDER TO A VOID CONFUSION AND AS A
DEFINITE GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYERS, AND THEIR INSURANCE
CARRIERS.
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The plaintiff, Continental Casualty Uo1npany ever
since the decision in the Continental Casualty case has
paid similar claims to the one herein involved where it
was the carrier for the employer at the time of the first
accident. So far as we are concerned we have considered
the law settled in this state. We have made no opposition to claims where we were the first carrier. If we are
now also to be held for the second accident, then, of
course, we are placed in a position where we must contest
every claim, as there is no certainty which way the Industrial Commission will rule. If it is desired to hold the
one liable who is the employer when the disability occurs,
then a different rule should be announced so that there
will be no uncertainty. The compensation laws were
designed, as this court has held so many times, to require
industry to bear the burden of the damage it causes, and
if it is the employer at the time the actual disability occurs who is the one who causes the actual industrial loss,
then we submit this court should place its decision
squarely upon that ground, and overrule the Continental
Casualty case, so that we will no longer be plagued with
hair-line distinctions or whimsical opinions of the Industrial Commission.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the decision as it now stands is
wrong and that a re-hearing should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES,
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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